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The core question behind this Frontiers research topic is whether explaining linguistic
phenomena requires appeal to properties of human cognition that are specialized to
language. We argue here that investigating this issue requires taking linguistic research
results seriously, and evaluating these for domain-specificity. We present a particular
empirical phenomenon, bound variable interpretations of pronouns dependent on a
quantifier phrase, and argue for a particular theory of this empirical domain that is
couched at a level of theoretical depth which allows its principles to be evaluated for
domain-specialization. We argue that the relevant principles are specialized when they
apply in the domain of language, even if analogs of them are plausibly at work elsewhere
in cognition or the natural world more generally. So certain principles may be specialized
to language, though not, ultimately, unique to it. Such specialization is underpinned by
ultimately biological factors, hence part of UG.
Keywords: universal grammar, domain specificity, bound variable anaphora, syntax semantics interface
1. Introduction
A core question in the cognitive science of language is whether explaining linguistic phenomena
requires appeal to properties of human cognition that are specific to the language-using capacity
of human beings. A common approach is to propose that domain general principles are at play
in language without showing how these principles have the empirical reach of well established
generalizations known within linguistics (Bybee and McClelland, 2005; Christiansen and Chater,
2015). This is not a strategy that is likely to lead to progress. A more promising alternative is to
attempt to match up known generalizations about language with proposals about domain general
principles (e.g., Culicover and Jackendoff, 2012). It seems to us, however, that a reasonable way to
answer the question of domain specificity, given the current state of knowledge in cognitive science,
is to develop theoretical approaches to linguistic phenomena which have as much empirical reach
and explanatory depth as possible, and to evaluate the posits of such theories for domain generality.
That third approach is what we engage in here.
There is nothing particularly totemic in the issue, at least from the perspective of generative
syntax. We should hope that aspects of our best theories of syntactic phenomena are simply
special cases of more general principles. But those more general principles are not established at
the moment, at least not in such a way as provide deep explanations of even rather elementary
properties of human syntax. Indeed, we think that generative syntax provides a potential way to
reach those more general principles, and that human language is a particularly rich domain for
the development of theories of some depth that may allow us to glimpse any deeper underlying
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regularities. The goal of this article is, then, to present a
well-developed theoretical proposal for an important linguistic
phenomenon and to show how the principles that underpin
the proposal reveal that abstract, high-level principles of the
computational construction of pairings of sound and meaning
are at play. We then evaluate whether these principles are specific
to language, concluding that the principle that licenses linguistic
structures is plausibly so, while the principles that regulate how
structures are interpreted are at least specialized to language,
though they may be not even specific to cognition.
We will make the general argument here through the
phenomenon of bound variable anaphora. The argument goes
as follows: (i) the phenomenon is a real phenomenon of human
language in general; (ii) there is a compelling generative theory
that limns its empirical contours rather exactly; (iii) there
are no equally empirically wide or theoretically compelling
competing accounts; (iv) some explanatory devices in the
successful theory appear to be specialized for language, as far
as current understanding goes (even if analogs of them may be
observed elsewhere in cognition).
Often generative syntactic analyses can be impenetrable to
those trained outside of the discipline, so we attempt here to drill
down to the core essentials and to make these accessible, drawing
out the more general theoretical implications for cognition, and
examining to what extent the theoretical principles we use are
specific to linguistic cognition.
2. Structural Constraints on Interpretation
2.1. Introducing Bound Variable Interpretations
The phenomenon we will use to make the argument here is
known as bound variable anaphora. Take the English sentence
in (1):
(1) No woman denies that she has written a best selling novel.
What is the meaning of this sentence? There are two that are
readily discernible (Evans, 1980). One is that, from a group of
women, not one denied that some individual (say Julie) had
written a best selling novel. Thismeaning is easily accessible given
either a preceding discourse to provide context, or, an individual
that is salient in the context where the sentence is uttered. For
example:
(2) Hello everyone. This is Julie, who’s recently been in the
news again. Now, no woman denies that she has written a
best selling series of novels featuring female protagonists,
but some deny that these novels are good for equal rights.
Following Evans, we’ll call this meaning, where the pronoun
receives its interpretation from the context, the referential
meaning.
The second meaning is simply that, if you have a group of
women, and you check all of them one by one, you will not find
any who deny that they themselves have written a best selling
novel. This is called the bound variablemeaning.
We also find this ambiguity effect with quantifier phrases
containing quantifiers other than no. For example, all of the
following sentences have the same ambiguity; the pronoun can
have a referential or a bound variable interpretation:
(3) a. Every woman said she had met the Shah.
b. Did any woman say that she had met the Shah?
c. Every woman persuaded her son to organize her
birthday party.
d. Each author decided that she should be at the
signing.
We find bound variable anaphora in various languages (Déchaine
and Wiltschko, 2014). For example, the Algonquian language
Passamaquoddy displays the same effect (Bruening, 2001):
(4) Psi=te
all=EMPH
wen
someone
litahasu
think.3
eli
that
w-itapi
3-friend.OBVP
woli-pomawsuwin-uw-ulti-htit
good-person-be-PLURAL-3PCONJ
“Everyone thinks his friends are good people.”
(5) Ma=te
NEG=EMPH
wen
someone
litahasi-w
think.3-NEG
nekom
he
mahtoqehs.
rabbit
“No one thinks he’s a rabbit.”
(6) Ma=te
NEG=EMPH
wen
someone
P-kosiciy-a-wiy-il
3-know.TA-DIR-NEG-OBV
eli
that
Maliw-ol
Mary-obv
muhsal-iht.
like-3CONJINV
“No one knows that Mary likes him.”
The following examples from Scottish Gaelic also show the same
effect:
(7) Thuirt
say.PAST
gach
each
caileag
girl
gu
that
robh
be.PAST
i
she
a’
PROG
faireachdainn
feeling
tinn.
sick
“Every girl said she was feeling sick.”
(8) Cha
NEG
robh
be.PAST
caileag
girl
sam
in
bith
being
ag
PROG
ràdh
say
gu
that
robh
be.PAST
i
she
tinn.
sick.
“No girl said she was sick.”
We have given these non-English examples to show that this
phenomenon is not simply a grammatical quirk of English or
other well studied European languages. The exact empirical
contours of bound variable anaphora, as outlined here and
explained below, are not, however, detectable in every language.
For a language to display this particular pattern, it needs to
have determiner quantifiers, which not all languages possess
(Bach et al., 1995). Further, it must have a determiner quantifier
that is singular. English has both singular determiner quantifiers
(as in “every boy”) and plural ones (e.g., “all boys”). Some
languages, however, lack singular determiner quantifiers. Further,
the language must ideally be able to use singular pronouns with
the singular quantifier to create the relevant reading. This is
also not available to all languages. Indeed, in English, the plural
pronoun is often used in informal discourse, especially when the
gender of the quantified noun phrase is unknown or avoided:
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for example “Every author was able to choose their own cover.”
In such circumstances, the plural pronoun can be construed as
referring to a group of individuals that is constructed out of all the
authors, similarly to the behavior of they in following discourse
in English: “Every author was grumpy. They had been locked out
of the decision about their book covers” (Kamp and Reyle, 1993;
Rullmann, 2003). The existence of this strategy makes discerning
true bound variable readings with plural pronouns challenging.
Beyond these basic requirements, languages place various other
restrictions on their pronouns which mean that quite careful
investigation is required to determine whether there is a bound
variable construction. However, we can control for these relevant
factors by cross-linguistic investigation, and when the various
conditions listed are met, the phenomenon reveals itself to be
very consistent.
Bound variable interpretations of pronouns, then, arise when
the meaning of a singular pronoun is dependent in a particular
way on the meaning of a singular quantifier phrase elsewhere
in the sentence (the importance of number and person features
for bound variable meanings across languages is discussed
in Kratzer (2009), Adger (2011); see Harbour (2014) for a
compatible theory of grammatical number). When a bound
variable interpretation is available in the examples we have
seen, a referential interpretation is also available, leading to the
ambiguity.
Let us turn now to structural constraints on the availability
of this interpretation. In certain cases, it turns out that the bound
variable meaning vanishes, and only the referential reading is left.
For example:
(9) a. A man who no woman likes denies that she has
written a best selling novel.
b. The man that every woman loved said she had met
the Shah.
c. The man that didn’t love any woman said she had
met the Shah.
d. That every woman seemed so sad persuaded me to
organize her birthday party.
e. Because every author hates you, she will try to kill
you.
If one pauses to think about the meanings of these sentences, it
turns out that they are not interpreted as involving the pronoun’s
meaning varying with the quantifier in the way we have just seen.
Compare, for example, (9-c) with (3-a). (3-a) can be paraphrased
as “Given a set of women salient in the context, for each choice
of some woman you make from that set, that woman you have
chosen said that she herself had met the Shah.” A corresponding
paraphrase for (9-c) would be “Given a salient set of women in
the context, for each choice you make from that set, the man
that didn’t love the woman you have chosen said that that that
woman had met the Shah.” But that paraphrase doesn’t capture
the meaning of the sentence in (9-c). In fact, the sentence only
has a paraphrase that goes something like “Given a salient set of
women in the context, the man that didn’t love any woman you
may choose from that set said that that she—some other female
person in the context—had met the Shah.” That is, the pronoun
she is not ambiguous between the two interpretations: it is only
referential. This is an odd meaning out of context, but is the only
meaning available.
This same effect holds for the other sentences, and countless
more pairs like them. Although we have illustrated the
phenomenon just by appealing to what meanings are intuitively
available for sentences here, it is experimentally robust (Kush
et al., 2015).
We also see bound variable readings disappear in
Passamaquoddy and in Scottish Gaelic, in certain circumstances.
(The ∗ in the examples here marks not ungrammaticality, but
rather the unavailability of the bound variable reading).
(10) ∗Ipocol
because
psi=te
all=EMPH
wen
someone
Sipayik
Sipayik
k-nacitaham-oq,
2-hate-INV
kt-oqeci=hc
2-try=FUT
nehpuh-uk
kill-INV
“Because everyone at Sipayik hates you, he will try to kill
you.”
And in Gaelic
(11) a. ∗Thuirt
say.PAST
duine
man
a
that
bhruidhinn
spoke
ris
to
gach
each
caileag
girl
gun
that
robh
be.PAST
i
she
tinn
sick
“A man that was talking to each girl said she was
sick.”
b. ∗Air sgath ’s
because
gun
that
do bhuail
hit.PAST
thu
you
gach
each
balach,
boy
ruith
run.PAST
e
he
air falbh
away
“Because you hit each boy, he ran away.”
In examples like those in (9), (10), and (11), the quantifier
precedes the pronoun just as it does in the examples in (1)
and (3). However, the bound variable reading is available in (1)
and (3) and is unavailable in (9), (10), and (11). So the issue
is not (merely) one of precedence. Various proposals have been
put forward in the generative literature as to what, exactly, is
responsible for the difference. The current consensus is that
there are two interrelated factors involved: semantic scope and
syntactic command (Safir, 2004; Barker, 2012; Déchaine and
Wiltschko, 2014).
2.2. Scope
Scope is simply a name for the fact that the interpretation
of certain units of language is computed as a subpart of the
interpretation of larger units, a cognitive factor that plausibly
exists elsewhere than in language. The larger unit is said to take
wide scope over the smaller unit. Consider the following cases:
(12) a. An author read every book.
b. An author thought every book was good.
c. An author thought Julie had read every book.
In (12-a), there are two meanings. In one meaning, we interpret
the phrase an author as dependent on the interpretation we
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provide for every book; that is, the semantic computation that
builds the meaning of every book includes a meaning assigned to
an author. In the other, the dependency is the other way around.
We can make this intuition explicit by sketching a procedure
to compute the meaning of the quantifier phrases. Let us take a
simpler example first:
(13) Every book is interesting.
We can treat computing the meaning of every book as
involving three separate computational procedures (Peters and
Westerståhl, 2006):
(14) a. Identify a salient set in the context of the discourse;
in this case a set of books (this set is called the
“restriction” of the quantifier).
b. Identify the property which is characterized by the
“scope” (the rest of the clause)—in this case, being
interesting.
c. Apply a quantificational operator (in this case
every) to determine whether every element of the
set of books is such that the property of being
interesting holds of it.
Similarly, we compute the meaning of an author by taking a set
of authors and checking whether a condition represented by the
rest of the sentence holds of one of the elements of that set.
(15) An author won this week’s lottery.
(16) a. Identify a salient set in the context of the discourse;
in this case a set of authors.
b. Identify the property which is characterized by
the “scope” (the rest of the clause)—in this case,
winning this week’s lottery.
c. Apply a quantificational operator (in this case an)
to determine whether at least one element of the set
of authors is such that the property of winning this
week’s lottery holds of that element.
These trivial cases are then put together for our example (12-a).
We can take either the set of books first, and then compute the
condition that holds of every book as involving an author, or
we can take an author first, and then see whether the condition
involving every book holds of an author. This gives us two
distinct meanings.
Let’s take every book first:
(17) Take a set of books salient in the context. Now go
through the books one by one, and for each choice you
make of a book, see whether an author (from a salient
set of authors) has read that book. Going through the set
of books, ensure that for all of the choices of book some
author has read the book chosen.
This process implies that it is possible to have a different author
for each book. This is the wide scope reading for every, as the
computation of an author takes place within the computation
for every book. The other meaning of an author read every book
works out as follows:
(18) Take a set of authors salient in the context. Now go
through the authors one by one and for each choice
made, go through the set of books salient in the context
and see whether the author you have chosen has read
every member of the set of books. Ensure that there is
at least one author of whom this condition holds.
This is the narrow scope reading for every. The crucial empirical
difference is that in the wide scope reading for every book, we can
have a different author picked for each different book, while in the
narrow scope reading, once we’ve picked our author, that author
needs to have read every book for the interpretation to be true.
It turns out that there are structural constraints on the scope of
quantifiers. Consider the sentence in (12-b): this doesn’t have the
wide scope reading for every. Neither does the sentence in (12-c).
This is because a quantifier cannot scope outside the tensed clause
it is in. This idea, that certain semantic effects are bound into
local syntactic domains, is of venerable descent in linguistics,
originally due to Langacker (1969). We’ll call it the Command
Generalization:
(19) The Command Generalization: A quantifier scopes over
everything in the minimal finite clause it appears in.
2.3. Applying Scope to Bound Variables
The generalization that seems to be most effective in determining
when a quantifier phrase can bind a pronoun is the following (this
is just a descriptive generalization, not a theory, as yet):
(20) The Scope Generalization: For a quantifier to bind a
pronoun it must scope over that pronoun.
For example, consider the following example:
(21) Every woman says that she has written a best selling
novel.
This sentence has the following rough paraphrase: take a set of
women. Now go through that set one by one, and see whether,
for each choice of a woman, that woman said that she, herself,
wrote a best selling novel. For the sentence to come out true, all
of the choices of individuals from the set of women should work.
Now compare that to the following case:
(22) A man who every woman likes says that she has written
a best selling novel.
If the quantifier phrase every woman could scope over the rest of
the sentence, it should be able to bind the pronoun. But we can
independently tell that every woman is restricted in its scope. If
we put a quantifier phrase like an author in place of she, we get:
(23) A man who every woman likes says that an author has
written a best selling novel.
We can see that every woman doesn’t, descriptively, scope over
an author, because the sentence doesn’t have a reading where
the authors potentially change for each choice made from the
set of women. So the Scope Generalization correctly correlates
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the capacity of a quantifier to scope over the pronoun with
its ability to bind the pronoun. The Command Generalization
captures why the quantifier doesn’t have wide scope over the
pronoun in this sentence: the quantifier is “trapped” within the
finite (relative) clause who every woman likes.
Together, the Scope Generalization and the Command
Generalization do a good job of capturing the data we have seen.
Consider again, our first example:
(24) No woman denies that she has written a best selling
novel.
Here, the smallest finite clause containing the quantifier phrase
no woman is the whole sentence. That sentence contains a further
clause that she has written a best selling novel and that clause
contains the pronoun. So no woman scopes over the pronoun she
and she can therefore have a bound reading, in the way described
above. For the sake of visualization, we can represent this as a
tree-like structure, where the scope of a quantifier phrase is its
sister in the tree:
(25)
NP
no woman
VP
denies
that
she VP
has written a best selling novel
Compare this with the corresponding example from (9), which
lacks a bound variable interpretation:
(26) A man who no woman likes denies that she has written
a best selling novel.
No woman is in a finite (relative) clause of its own who no woman
likes. It cannot therefore take scope over the whole sentence, so
the pronoun she cannot be bound. Again, we can visualize the
structure in a tree-like fashion:
(27)
NP
a man who no woman likes
VP
denies
that
she VP
has written a best selling novel
Here the scope of the quantifier phrase is again its sister
in the tree, but the sister of no woman is just the verb
likes, and so the quantifier phrase does not scope over the
pronoun.
Our descriptive generalizations also capture the fact that the
bound reading vanishes in examples like the following:
(28) a. She persuaded the Shah that every woman should
be imprisoned.
b. She didn’t believe that I had been introduced to any
woman.
c. She expected that each author’s book signing would
be private.
Here, the quantifier phrases are inside an embedded finite clause,
and the Command Generalization stops them scoping over the
whole sentence, so the pronoun cannot be bound. (28-a), for
example, can’t have a paraphrase where for each individual
chosen from a set of women, that individual persuaded the Shah
to imprison her.1
Summarizing, we have seen that the phenomenon of bound
variable anaphora is a real phenomenon, appearing cross-
linguistically in unrelated languages when the conditions allow
it to be detected. We have also seen that its empirical distribution
can be described by a number of high-level descriptive
generalizations:
(29) The Scope Generalization: For a quantifier to bind a
pronoun it must scope over that pronoun.
(30) The Command Generalization: A quantifier scopes over
everything in the minimal finite clause it appears in.
Returning to the core issue, these generalizations appear to
involve concepts that are quite specific to language: quantifier,
binding, pronoun, scope, minimal finite clause. If we accept the
generalizations in this form, it would seem that we are committed
to highly domain specific analyses for this phenomenon. Indeed,
that conclusion was adopted by generative grammar in some
form in the 1980s and is consistent with a view of the evolution
of language that sees it as an accretion of small evolutionary
steps (e.g., Pinker and Bloom, 1990). However, current proposals
derive these generalizations from more abstract principles and
it is these, we believe, that should be evaluated for domain-
specificity.
1There is one final aspect to the phenomenon of bound variable interpretations
which is not captured by scope and command: sometimes a quantifier phrase can
take scope over a pronoun, but it cannot bind it. If all that is required is the Scope
Generalization, examples like the following should be well formed with a bound
variable reading:
(i) a. She loved every author.
b. He killed each man.
(ii) a. Her publicist loves every author.
b. His friend killed each man.
The examples in (i) do not have bound variable readings. This doesn’t follow from
what we have said so far.
These phenomena (noted for questions by Postal, 1971, extended to quantifiers by
Chomsky, 1976, and dubbed Strong and Weak Crossover, respectively) cannot be
captured by the Scope and Command Generalizations alone. Various approaches
have been taken to this phenomenon, the Weak Crossover case is variable across
languages, and there is no clear consensus on its analysis. We will not attempt to
capture this data here.
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3. A Theoretical Account
Generative accounts of linguistic phenomena are couched at a
level of analysis that is close to Marr’s (1982) Computational
Level. That is, the theory specifies a system that guarantees a
particular pairing of sounds and meanings across a potentially
unbounded domain. A helpful analogy would be an axiomatized
theory for arithmetic, that can specify, for a potentially infinite
set of pairs of integers, what the sum is. How people actually add,
that is, how they use this system, is distinct from what the system
is. The kinds of empirical effect described above, when structures
are ambiguous or not between referential and bound variable
interpretations of pronouns, is specified by the system at the
computational level, rather than being a side effect of processing.
How the system is put into use in parsing, production, etc., is a
distinct question (Chomsky, 1967 et seq).
Within current generative grammar, one approach that has
been taken to the core question of how to pair up particular
linguistic forms of sentences with their meanings is the theory
of Merge. Merge is a principle of structure generation that is
incorporated into a theory of what legitimate syntactic structures
can be. It says that a syntactic unit can be combined with another
syntactic unit tomake a new syntactic unit, providing unbounded
resources for the use of language.
We can recursively define a syntactic unit as follows (cf.
Chomsky, 1995):
(31) a. Lexical items are syntactic units.
b. If A and B are syntactic units then Merge(A, B) =
{A, B} is a syntactic unit.
This theory takes us from a finite list (of word-like atomic lexical
items) to an unbounded set of hierarchical structures. (31) is a
theory of what the legitimate structures in human language are,
presumably neurally implemented (Embick and Poeppel, 2015).
But these structures cannot be used as language unless they
interface with the systems of sound and meaning. The definition
of syntactic unit, incorporating Merge, in (31) is not sufficient
for specifying language unless we add a set of principles for
mapping those objects to interpretations in terms of sound and
meaning. This is a point that often goes under-appreciated in
literature, following Hauser et al. (2002), about whether language
just consists of recursion.2
One such mapping principle has to do with the periodicity
that regulates the transfer of syntactic object to the phonological
and semantic systems: the idea is that this mapping takes
place at certain points in the construction of a syntactic object
(again, keeping to the computational level here). We will take
these points to be finite clauses; though that is a simplification
(Chomsky, 2008), it is sufficient for our purposes here. This is
our first interface mapping principle:
(32) Transfer: Transfer the minimal structure containing the
finite complementizer to phonological and semantic
2In their words, “We propose in this hypothesis that FLN [the faculty of language
in the narrow sense] comprises only the core computational mechanisms of
recursion as they appear in narrow syntax and the mappings to the interfaces”
(Hauser et al., 2002, p. 1573) [emphasis ours].
computations. Once a structure has been transfered, it is
no longer accessible to further syntactic computation.3
The phonological and semantic computations transduce
information delivered by the structure building system into
forms that can be used by mechanisms of processing, production,
planning, etc.
These two very general theoretical principles, Merge and
Transfer, are motivated by empirical phenomena unconnected
to bound variable anaphora. Merge is motivated by the need
to capture basic constituency and hierarchy effects in human
language, while Transfer (of finite clauses) is motivated by the
special status finite clauses have in syntactic phenomena in
general: they are the locus of subject case assignment, of semantic
tense specification, and of locality domains for displacement
operations (Adger, 2015, for review). However, these two ideas,
as we will show, take us a long way in capturing the empirical
distribution of the bound variable interpretation phenomenon,
which we now turn to.
We notate syntactic units as sets. When a syntactic unit is
transfered, the result is notated as a set, flanked by a phonological
representation above and a semantic one below.
We simplify phonological representations massively by
using orthographic representations and a simple concatenation
operator⌢ to represent string order. There is far more structure
in phonological representations, including information about
prosody, phonological phrasing, and segmental properties, but
we will ignore this here.
We simplify semantic representations by using a simplified
logical representation with variables and connectives augmented
by a representation for natural language quantifiers. Following
much work in semantics, as well as the discussion above, we
take a quantified sentence to have three semantically contentful
parts: a restriction, the quantifier itself, and a scope (Barwise
and Cooper, 1981). These correspond to the computational
operations described above: identifying a salient set in the
context, quantifying over it, and determining whether a condition
holds of the members of the set picked out by the quantifier. We
notate these three parts, as is standard, by writing the quantifier
plus the variable it binds, a colon, then the restrictor in square
brackets followed by the scope in square brackets, thus:
(33) Q x:[...x...][...x...]
This set of simplifying assumptions about the interface mappings
will suffice for our purposes here.
Now consider the derivation of the sentence in (34). This
derivation should be understood as a computational specification
3What constitutes a finite complementizer across languages will be left unspecified
here. For English, the embedding finite complementizer is that, while matrix finite
clauses have no pronounced finite complementizer. In the derivations below, we’ll
simply assume that finite matrix clauses are transfered once completed, but it
should be borne in mind that technically there is a more complex syntax involved.
There is also a question to be answered about relative clauses, where, as we will see
the minimal structure containing the finite complementizer is transfered only once
the particular requirements of that complementizer are all satisfied. This provides
certain elements (in wh-questions, topicalizations and relative clauses, but not
quantifiers) with a limited capacity to evade locality effects. We will abstract away
from these further details here.
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of a sound-meaning pairing, much as a proof in logic is a
computational specification of a theorem derivable from a set of
axioms. This computational specification is part of a particular
linguistic action [say an utterance of (34)], but does not causally
determine the action.
(34) Noone said that he danced.
(35) a. Merge(he, danced)= {he, danced}
b. Merge (that, {he, danced}) = Transfer, since that is
a finite complementizer
that⌢he⌢danced←PHON
{that, {he, danced}}
SEM→ y danced
Here the hierarchy partly determines order and the
pronoun is semantically translated as the variable y.
c. Merge(said, {that, {he, danced}})= {said, {that, {he,
danced}}}
d. Merge(Noone, {said, {that, {he, danced}}} )=
noone⌢said⌢that⌢he⌢danced←PHON
{noone, {said, {that, {he, danced}}}}
SEM→ No x:[x is a person][x said y danced and
x=y]
As the phonological and semantic information is transfered
to the relevant interfaces, information about linear order,
pronunciation, and semantic interpretation accretes. Crucially,
the statement that the variable x has the same value as y is added
within the scope of the interpretation of the quantifier noone,
just as in the informal paraphrase given in the last section. This
ensures that it is interpreted as bound. Of course, we can equate
x to another variable not in the scope of the quantifier, in which
case we get the referential reading, thus accounting for the core
ambiguity we began with. Equation of variables in itself could
conceivably be a purely semantic, possibly non-linguistic process,
at the heart of anaphoric dependency of all sorts, but the bound
interpretation is constrained by how the building up of structures
interacts with their interpretation.
Now let us look at a case where variable binding is not
possible:
(36) Friends that no woman knew said that she danced.
In the following derivation, steps (a–c) build up the verb phrase
said that she danced and steps (d–h) independently build up the
subject Friends that no woman knew. Although (d–h) is ordered
after (a–b), this is just an artifact of writing down the derivation.
One can think of these as separate derivations taking place in
parallel.
(37) a. Merge(she, danced)= {she, danced}
b. Merge (that, {she, danced})=
that⌢she⌢danced←PHON
{that, {she, danced}}
SEM→ y danced
Steps (a-b) build up the embedded clause that she
danced, which contains the pronoun of interest.
c. Merge(said, {that, {she, danced}})= {said, {that, {she,
danced}}}
d. Merge(knew, friends)= {knew, friends}
e. Merge(no, woman)= {no, woman}
f. Merge({no, woman}, {knew, friends}) = {{no,
woman}, {knew, friends}} This part of the derivation
builds up the relative clause that no woman knew.
Note that the item friends is Merged with the verb
knew, which is why it is interpreted as the object of
that verb. However, the actual relative clause has a
gap in the object position. This necessitates the next
part of the derivation:
g. Merge(that, {{no, woman}, {knew, friends}}) = {that,
{{no, woman}, {knew, friends}}}
h. Merge(friends, {that, {{no, woman}, {knew,
friends}}})=
The subject friends that no woman knew involves
a further Merge operation that takes the object
of the verb knew, which is the unit friends, and
Merges it with the whole structure that no woman
knew friends. This happens in English because of a
property of relative complementizers that triggers
this displacement. Languages vary in whether relative
clauses involve this kind of displacement Merge, with
some leaving the object in its base position (Cole,
1987).
At this point, the whole relative clause is built up.
Following the Transfer principle, what is transfered is
the unit containing the relative complementizer that:
that⌢no⌢woman⌢knew←PHON
{friends, {that, {{no, woman}, {knew, friends}}}}
SEM→ λy: No x:[x is a woman] [x knows y]
In English, as just mentioned, only the higher of the
two occurrences of friends is pronounced. In other
languages, the lower occurrence is pronounced. We
do not know of languages where both occurrences
are pronounced. This suggests another mapping
principle:
Pronounce Once: When a single object appears at
more than one position in a structure, pronounce
only one instance.
This principle, together with the Transfer principle,
gives us the phonological representation above.
The semantics associated with this piece of structure
is the tripartite structure we are familiar with, whose
domain is restricted to a set of women, and whose
scope is the verb phrase of the relative clause
(basically the verb knew and its object). We adopt a
standard approach to relative clause semantics (Heim
and Kratzer, 1998): the transfered object friends is
just translated to a variable bound by the relative
complementizer that, and we notate this semantics in
the standard way as λy:[...y...].
i. Merge({friends, {that, {{no, woman}, {knew,
friends}}}}, {said, {that, {she, danced}}})
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friends⌢that⌢no⌢woman⌢knew⌢said⌢that⌢
she⌢danced←PHON
{ { friends, {that, {{no, woman}, {knew, friends}}}},
{said, {that, {she, danced}}}}
SEM→ some y: [y are friends and No x: [x is a
woman] [x knows y]] [y said w danced]
The final chunk of the derivation combines the whole
subject with its VP. The VP is built up in step (c),
and the output of that is Merged with the output of
step (h). Phonologically, we simply concatenate these
in the order required by English. Semantically, we
take the bare noun friends to be interpreted with an
existential quantifier some. We identify the variable
this quantifier binds with that of the relative clause,
and that is the variable that is the subject of the
verb phrase. The pronoun in the embedded clause is
translated as a further variable.
At this point, however, it is not possible to connect x and w, since
the interpretation of the quantifier phrase no woman has already
been completed, and the variable x has been fully interpreted,
before w is encountered. This derives the simple cases of the
Scope Generalization directly from very general principles of the
relationship between syntax and semantics: the pronoun cannot
be interpreted as bound unless it is computed within the scope of
the quantifier.
The more outré effects of the Scope Principle are also
amenable to the same set of basic principles. Recall that a
quantifier can scope over everything inside the finite clause it is
immediately contained within. With this in mind, consider the
derivation of (38):
(38) She believed that every author danced.
(39) a. Merge(every, author)= {every, author}
b. Merge({every, author}, danced) = {{every, author},
danced}
c. Merge(that, {{every, author}, danced}) = {that,
{{every, author}, danced}}
that⌢every⌢author⌢danced←PHON
{that, {{every, author}, danced}}
SEM→ Every x:[x is an author][x danced]
d. Merge(believed, {that, {{every, author}, danced}})
= {believed, {that, {{every, author}, danced}}}
e. Merge(she, {believed, {that, {{every, author},
danced}}}) = {she, {believed, {that, {{every,
author}, danced}}}}
she⌢believed⌢that⌢every⌢author⌢danced
←PHON
{she, {believed, {that, {{every, author}, danced}}}}
SEM→ y believed that Every x:[x is an author][x
danced]
The variable x is fully computed with values assigned, before y is
introduced. It follows that themeaning of the pronoun she cannot
depend on the quantifier, so the bound variable interpretation is
correctly predicted to be unavailable.
Compare this to the following case:
(40) Every author’s publicist loved her.
(41) a. Merge(every, author)= {every, author}
b. Merge({every, author}, publicist) = {{every,
author}, publicist}
c. Merge(loved, her)= {loved, her}
d. Merge({{every, author}, publicist}, {loved, her}) =
{{{every, author}, publicist}, {loved, her}}
e. Merge({every, author}, {{{every, author}, publicist},
{loved, her}})=
every⌢authors⌢publicist⌢loved⌢her←PHON
{{every, author}, {{{every, author}, publicist},
{loved, her}}}
SEM→ Every x:[x is an author][THE y:[y is
publicist of x][y loves w and w=x]]
In step (e), theMerge operation allows the quantifier phrase every
author to scope, in its finite clause, higher than the pronoun. This
computational step is usually called Quantifier Raising, and is a
syntactic way of marking the semantic scope of the quantifier,
but in the theoretical system it is just another application of the
operation Merge.
Just as we saw with the relative clause case, a single syntactic
unit (in this case the quantifier phrase every author) is Merged
with the larger unit that contains it, creating two occurrences
of the phrase. One occurrence of this quantifier phrase is now
high in the structure. This means that when its semantics is
computed, it takes scope over the whole clause. The upshot of
this is that the variable introduced by the pronoun is introduced
at a point where the variable bound by the quantifier is still being
computed. This allows them to be identified (notated here as w=
x) and the bound variable reading to arise.
On the phonological side of the computation, one of
the occurrences of the quantifier phrase is not transfered to
the phonological component following the mapping principle
Pronounce Once (just as we saw with the relative clause). For
the case of quantifiers in English, it is the higher rather than the
lower occurrence that is not transfered, giving us the effect that
the quantifier is interpreted high in the structure, but pronounced
low. No extension of the computational technology already
appealed to is necessary to capture this. Which occurrence is
pronounced is a point of cross-linguistic variation; for example in
Hungarian the higher occurrence is pronounced (see Kiss, 1981).
We might ask whether we could follow the same kind
of derivation we have just seen, and allow the quantifier to
Merge higher in (38), hence generating the unattested binding
possibilities. However, recall that transfer applies to finite
clauses and that once a finite clause is transfered, no further
computation is possible. Given this, the quantifier phrase in
(38) cannot be moved to a position where it scopes over the
pronoun.
The principles sketched here are sufficient to capture the
phenomena we have surveyed. The effects of the Scope
and Command Generalizations emerge from possible Merge
operations interacting with the way that finite clauses are
transfered to the phonology and the semantics.We have suceeded
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in making the descriptive generalizations special cases of much
more general principles of structure building and how structures
are mapped to the interfaces. We have not shown here how
these more general principles play a role in explanations of
other phenomena, as this would entail a book rather than a
paper. However, these general principles of structure building
and mapping to the interface are effective in deriving a slew of
generalizations about the syntactic structure of human languages.
3.1. Further Predictions
The theoretical work we have just done, however, goes beyond
our core generalizations, because bound variable interpretations
interact in a complex way with other phenomena. The following
cases do not follow from the generalizations directly, but they do
follow from the theoretical system:
(42) a. Which of his relatives did the sybils decree that no
man may love?
b. Which of his relatives forced the sybils to decree
that no man was innocent?
In (42-a), the pronoun can receive a bound variable
interpretation, which is not available in (42-b). Why should
this be?
Consider (42-a) in more detail. It includes the phrase which of
his relatives, which is interpreted as the object of the verb love
in the embedded clause. This entails that it is initially Merged
with love in a derivation that then later involves the Merge of
no man. The phrase which of his relatives is then Merged again
with the finite clause, and the remainder of that finite clause is
transfered to the phonological and semantic systems, just as we
saw for relative clauses above. This means that our derivation will
reach a point that looks as follows (we do not show the internal
structure of which of his relatives):
(43)
that⌢no⌢man⌢love⌢← PHON
{{[which of his relatives]}, {that, {{no, man}, { may {love, {[which
of his relatives]}}}}}}
SEM→ y: no x:[x is a man][x may love y: y is a relative of z and
z=x]
Here the variable z is introduced for the pronoun his at a point
in the computation where the phrase which of his relatives is
in the scope of the quantifier phrase no man. When the finite
clause that no man may love is transfered, the syntactic unit
which of his relatives is in the object position, and so what is
transfered to the semantic computation is a structure where the
pronoun’s interpretation is computed within the computation of
the quantifier phrase. Because of this, we can add the condition
that z = x, where x is the variable introduced by the quantifier
phrase. The higher occurrence of the phrase which of his relatives
then undergoes further Merge, after the introduction of the
material in the higher clause, to derive the whole sentence with
the bound reading.
Compare this, however, to (42-b). Here the phrase which
of his relatives is the subject of the higher verb force. It is
never, therefore, in the scope of the quantifier phrase no man
at any point in the derivation, and there is therefore no means
of allowing the pronoun his to be bound by that quantifier.
The underlying system of computations that build structure
and transfer it to phonological and semantic systems correctly
predicts a rather sophisticated distribution of form-meaning
relations, going well beyond the basic descriptive generalizations.
We have now come most of the way through the argument.
We have introduced the phenomenon of bound variable readings
and seen that it is present cross-linguistically; we have outlined
the core aspects of the phenomenon and shown how the
descriptive generalizations about the phenomenon derive from
a theoretical account built on deep, abstract principles stated
at a computational level of analysis that specifies the sound-
meaning relationships for an unbounded set of structures. We
have also shown how that system extends to the interactions
between bound variable anaphora and other syntactic and
semantic phenomena. Before we evaluate the domain-specificity
or domain-generality of these principles, however, we should
ask whether there is a compelling alternative account of this
phenomenon that does not appeal to operations that build and
interpret structure.
3.2. A Cognitive Grammar Account
The answer to this question is that there is not. The only in depth
discussion of the phenomenon that is non-generative and covers
a similar range of empirical phenomena is van Hoek (1996),
who provides an investigation of bound variable anaphora within
the framework of Cognitive Grammar. Van Hoek argues that
whether a pronoun can be bound is dependent on the salience or
prominence of the quantificational antecedent. For the relevant
cases, she defines salient as occupying the Figure in a Figure-
Ground structure. Figure Ground relations are plausibly used
across cognition (Talmy, 1975). The Figure Ground relationship
is conceived of purely semantically in van Hoek’s work. We
give here a standard specification of how this relation is to be
understood within language (Talmy, 2000, p. 312):
(44) a. The Figure is a moving or conceptually movable
entity whose path, site, or orientation is conceived
as a variable, the particular value of which is the
relevant issue.
b. The Ground is a reference entity, one that has
a stationary setting relative to a reference frame,
with respect to which the Figure’s path, site, or
orientation is characterized.
No doubt the notion of Figure-Ground relation is an important
semantic schema in cognition. However, contrary to van Hoek’s
proposal, it does not seem to be implicated in defining salience
for bound variable anaphora. There are numerous cases where
the subject of a sentence is the Ground, rather than the Figure
but this does not impact on the distribution of bound variable
anaphora.
Talmy gives examples such as the room filled with smoke,
where the Figure is the smoke which moves or changes with
respect to the room, which is therefore the Ground. In van
Hoek’s approach, we would expect the object to act as a salient
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antecedent for a pronoun in the subject position, but this is not
what we find, using examplesmodeled on Talmy’s patternGround
filled with Figure:
(45) a. Each room filled with the scent of the flowers in its
center.
b. ∗Its vase filled with each blooming flower.
Here we find that a quantifier phrase which is semantically the
Ground can bind a pronoun in the Figure, and conversely that
a quantifier phrase that is the Figure cannot bind a Ground
pronoun.
The verb contain, by definition, also has a Figure as object
and Ground as subject. Again, if the Figure is always salient,
van Hoek’s system incorrectly predicts the wrong binding
possibilities:
(46) a. Each book contains its author’s biography as an
initial chapter.
b. ∗Its initial chapter contains a synopsis of each book.
Some action verbs, especially those of consumption, have been
analyzed as involving a Figure object moving with respect to
a Ground subject. Once again, the binding patterns we see
empirically are unexpected on an approach like van Hoek’s.
(47) a. Each giant gobbled up his own child.
b. ∗His child gobbled up each father.
In all of these cases, the Figure is the object, and hence, in
van Hoek’s proposals, the possible binding relations should
have exactly the reverse distribution from the standard cases.
One might try to rescue the system by proposing some special
semantic relation to be associated with subjecthood that overrides
Figure-Ground relations, but that, of course, would be circular
in the absence of an independently verifiable, purely semantic
specification for what a subject is. Van Hoek provides no such
specification.
One might attempt to supplement van Hoek’s proposal
by appealing to information structure effects on salience. For
example, we could ensure that the relevant set of books is pre-
established in the context, and that universal quantification over
this set is also pre-established, and further we can ensure that the
quantifier phrase is a Figure. But still the structural facts override
all of these potential cues and are determinant of what the
binding possibilities are. Binding from a highly salient Ground
object into a pronoun in the subject position is impossible:
(48) There are a whole lot of new books on display at the
convention this year and they’ve all got something in
common: ∗Its initial chapter contains a synopsis of each
book.
We do not want to deny that pragmatic principles may have
an impact on the processing of bound variable anaphora as
it is clear that this is a factor in understanding the full
empirical range of effects (Ariel, 1990). Effects of temporal
order (the quantificational binder normally precedes the bound
pronoun, though see (42-a) for an example of the opposite)
may well fall into this category. However, such principles do
not, by themselves, explain the empirical distribution of the
phenomenon.
There is a larger issue connected to domain specificity that
emerges from attempts, like vanHoek’s, to explain bound variable
anaphora, and other syntactic phenomena, by appeal to non-
structural, cognition-wide, properties. Structure, when at play,
always trumps the effect of semantic, informational, pragmatic or
social properties. If phenomena are not structurally constrained,
then we need explanations for why such factors do not regularly
play a part in determining bound variable anaphora.
Languages vary according to what kinds of expressions can be
bound by quantifiers (Déchaine and Wiltschko, 2014), but they
are always restricted structurally. This is striking, especially since
pronouns can refer to entities which are salient or prominent in
the discourse context in a variety of ways.
For example, pronominal elements like that and it can be
differentiated by a measure of givenness (Gundel et al., 1993).
According to Gundel et al. (1993), it refers to the focus of
attention in the discourse at the time, whereas that picks out
a referent which is “activated” in the discourse, i.e., brought
into current short-term memory, normally by being mentioned,
but is not in the focus of attention. This is illustrated in the
following pair (modeled on examples from Gundel et al.), where
the subject in (49-a) is naturally understood as the focus of
attention and can be referred back to by it. In contrast, the dog
in (49-b) is not naturally understood as the focus of attention,
and hence it is infelicitous in the continuation (as indicated by
#), but since the referent is activated, it can be referred to by
that.
(49) a. My neighbor’s rottweiler chased my cat this
morning. It’s the same dog that ate my cat’s food last
week.
b. Ikea delivered playground equipment to my
neighbor with the rottweiler this morning. #It’s the
same dog that ate my cat’s food last week [ok: That’s
the same dog that ate my cat’s food last week].
Since notions like focus of attention are linguistically relevant in
the choice of it vs. that, we might expect to find a language in
which the same categories of givenness are relevant to quantifier
binding. For example, the focus of attention, if quantified, would
be able to bind a pronoun, as in the following example.
(50) Every one of my neighbor’s dogs chased one of my cats.
#It’s the same dog that ate the cat’s food last week.
Here, the bound reading would be that there are pairings of dogs
and cats, where the dog that chased a cat also ate that particular
cat’s food. Such a reading is impossible in English as seen in
(50), even though the quantified subject is in focus and should
therefore be a legitimate antecedent for English it.
Compare the salient bound reading when the structural
conditions on quantifier binding are met, in (51).
(51) Every dog chased one of my cats before it ate the cat’s
food.
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What is important is not that English doesn’t allow a bound
reading in (50), it’s that no language has been reported which
does. This suggests that the mechanism for assigning reference to
pronouns is not highly variable, across languages; it can pick up a
non-quantified focus of attention without structural conditions,
as in (49-a), but it can be bound by a quantifier only when
introduced in the phase of the derivation in which the quantifier
is interpreted, as argued above and as illustrated by the infelicity
of (50).
In fact, much more exotic language systems are imaginable,
and it is quite striking that they are unattested. There is
remarkable cultural diversity, for example concerning how
important social hierarchy is to a society. Some societies have
complex systems of rank and class and their languages have
complex ways of encoding respect and deference and entitlement,
as in Japanese. Other societies are relatively egalitarian and their
languages lack these honorifics, for example traditional Khoi
society (Lee, 1979).
If languages interacted with general cognition in unrestrained
ways, we might expect to find a language in which the honorific
system was so important that it mattered for aspects of syntax
such as quantifier binding. Imagine a language in which only
socially superior entities could bind quantifiers. In this language,
a speaker could have a bound reading for (52-a), but (52-b) could
only have the referential reading for the pronoun.
(52) a. Every nobleman called to his slave.
b. Every slave called to his master.
Once again, such a language is unattested, suggesting that at least
some aspects of pronominal reference resolution are language
specific, and not permeable to arbitrary cognitive domains.
4. Domain Specific, Domain Specialized or
Domain General?
The purpose of this section is not to argue that the principles
(Merge, Transfer, Pronounce Once) so far discussed are, or are
not, specific to language, but rather to sketch out the kinds of
issues that can be addressed, and directions for investigation
that can be pursued, once principles with explanatory depth
and empirical reach are established. The principles we have
identified can easily be understood as specific to language (a
traditional view). This section argues that it is perhaps possible to
understand them as language-specialized versions of very general
cognitive and computational factors, though this is speculative.
Crucially, however, these principles are mysterious when viewed
from the perspective of communication, interaction, and general
learning, concepts which provide little theoretical traction on
important empirical phenomena of syntax and semantics.
Explanation of the unbounded link between structure and
meaning requires a recursively specified procedure, or its
equivalent. This is an underappreciated point. Some cognitive
mechanism must be able to generate, and not simply retrieve,
a form-meaning pair, since the number of such pairs is both
in practice and in principle too large to store. Once there is
such a mechanism, there is a generative system that restricts the
possible form-meaning pairings. The fact that some structures
(for example those involving center embedding of elements of
the same category) are difficult to process, or are never used, is
irrelevant to the question of whether there is such a procedure,
for reasons understood since Miller (1956), contra Christiansen
and Chater (2015). The particular formation of Merge we have
given, in addition, generates constituent structures with maximal
levels of branchingness (two, for the formulation we adopt here)
and a scaffolding on which to hook compositional construction
of meaning. We have modeled this operation as a set formation
operation applying to elements in a restricted domain. We will
also use the term Merge as the name for the modeled physical
properties.
As we have presented Merge, its domain is restricted
to what we called “syntactic units” in (31). It operates on
discrete linguistic units (morphemes or words) to create larger,
structured, discrete units (phrases). There seem to be few
other cases of systems displaying this kind of generative
nature elsewhere in human cognition. Arithmetic and tonal
music have been discussed as recursive generative systems that
involve similar structure-building operations (Hurford, 1987;
Rohrmeier, 2008). Suppose that we posit A-Merge and T-
Merge alongside L-Merge for the structure-building operations
involved in arithmetic, tonal music, and language, respectively.
The difference, if any, would lie in what domain these various
kinds of Merge are restricted to: tonal music combines elements
with sound but no meaningful content, and arithmetic combines
elements with abstract content (which can be counted) but
no fixed sound, while language combines elements which
are pairings of meaning and sound (or other externalizable
form).
Humans have natural capacities for arithmetic and tonal
music differing substantially from the natural abilities of the other
primates (Tomonaga and Matsuzawa, 2000; Carey, 2001). There
is good evidence, in fact, that nonhuman primates lack Merge
(Yang, 2013), which entails that there was an evolutionary event
which led to human brains havingMerge. At the same time, many
cultures do not develop any arithmetic (Izard et al., 2008) or tonal
music (Lomax, 1968; Wallin et al., 2000), so it is fairly clear that
the pressures of natural selection could not have led to humans
as a species having these particular abilities (as Darwin, 1871,
noted). One is led to the conclusion that either A-Merge and T-
Merge are the same thing as L-Merge, or biproducts of it, or else a
single evolutionary event led to all of the different kinds ofMerge.
These three apparent alternatives may simply reduce to a matter
of how the terms are defined.
It is clear that language is used as a communication system and
that it makes central use of Merge; but it is less clear that Merge-
based communication provided an evolutionary advantage that
caused Merge-endowed brains to be selected for. It is just as
plausible that Merge-endowed brains had some other advantage,
for example in planning, or in reasoning, or in memory. In fact,
Chomsky (1966, 2010) has speculated that the generative system
of language might essentially be a system of thought, not of
communication; communication would be something one can do
with language, once it is “externalized” (i.e., pronounced audibly,
or articulated visually or tactilely).
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This scenario changes the terms of the question of whether
Merge is specific to language; language in fact takes on a much
larger role as a central part of cognition. In this scenario, Merge
is not specific to language-qua-communication system. Merge
is rather a property of a more general system of symbolic
thought, a core component of language understood to be a
generative system. The question of whether arithmetic and/or
tonal music are also instantiations of it is secondary, since
plausible evolutionary paths suggest that arithmetic and tonal
music were not causally central to the philogenetic emergence of
Merge.4
We might consider the other two principles we appealed
to in an analogous manner. These principles govern the way
that the structures generated by Merge are interpreted by
phonological and semantic systems. The first of these principles
is the following.
(53) Transfer: Transfer the minimal structure containing
the finite complementiser to phonological and semantic
computations. Once a structure has been transfered, it is
no longer accessible to further syntactic computation.
This principle actually has three components: (i) it imposes
a periodicity on the transfer of information between the
structure creating and the interpretive systems; (ii) it imposes an
opacity condition so that transfered structure is inaccessible for
further computation; (iii) it specifies finiteness as a flag for the
application of transfer. We take these in turn.
The theoretical architecture we defended as an analysis of
bound variable anaphora (and many other syntactic phenomena)
is stated, as we said, at the computational level—it specifies
what function is computed. But the particular principles we
have used are fundamentally computational in a different sense
too: they involve the alteration of discrete structures according
to a set of rules applying to these structures. Merge creates
and manipulates an unbounded set of discrete structures of
certain forms from a finite list of discrete inputs (roughly,
abstract representations of words or morphemes). It is the
computational nature of Merge that allows it to provide an
explanation for the fundamental fact that human languages
can be unbounded in how they connect forms to meanings.
Periodicity in computation, a core aspect of (53), is plausibly
a general natural law, going beyond domain general laws of
cognition (Strogatz and Stewart, 1993). Periodicity also appears
to be ubiquitous in biological phenomena, possibly evolving as a
side effect of efficiency conditions relating successful organisms
to their environments within constraints imposed by physical
law (Glass and Mackey, 1988). It is certainly speculative, but at
least the periodicity part of (53) may be a factor that is domain
general, not only with respect to human cognition, but also to
physical or computational systems in general. If that is true, then
the organization of information transfer between Merge-built
structures and other systems of the mind is not language specific,
not cognition specific, not human specific and possibly not even
biology specific.
4Though there are proposals that accord musical ability a more central role in
language evolution, cf. Darwin (1871), Brandt et al. (2012) and references there.
However, there is more to (53) than just the periodicity of the
transfer of syntactic information. There is also the notion that
syntactic information, once transfered, is no longer accessible to
further computation. This idea is not only important in capturing
the limitations on quantifier scope, but also for locality effects
elsewhere in syntax, such as the ubiquitous locality effects seen
in long-distance dependencies (Chomsky, 1973, et seq). Locality
of this sort may also be reducible to more general properties. Any
computational system requires organized space (such as a look-
up table), which stores information that is used multiple times in
a computation. Again, there is some speculation here, but it does
not seem implausible that such storage space is limited in human
cognition, so that once the syntactic information is transfered,
the relevant storage space is no longer available at the next stage
of the computation. Working memory in other areas of human
cognition (when used, for example, in processing language or
other information) is known to be restricted (Miller, 1956;
Baddeley, 1992); storage space in the computation that defines
well formed structures in a language may be likewise restricted.
This would be a case of a general principle of space optimization,
which applies across cognition and hence is domain general,
operating in a specialized way within the syntactic system to
restrict the space available for computation.
It is important, however, to note that these domain general
principles (periodicity and space optimization) are applying to
linguistic data structures (structures generated by Merge) not as
principles of processing, but at a Marrian computational level, as
principles that constrain the range of possible syntactic objects.
We draw much the same lesson here as we did in our discussion
of Merge: the same abstract principle may be at work in different
domains of cognition, and how it plays out in those domains
will be affected by the nature of the primitives of those domains.
So the operation of the principles is specialized to the particular
structures in the relevant domain, but the principles themselves
may be entirely general.
The final aspect of the Transfer principle we have not
discussed is the idea that it involves finiteness. Finiteness appears
to be a formal property, with some connection to both meaning
(especially to the interpretation of tense) and to morphological
form (the shape of complementizers, case assignment etc.), but
it operates within the syntactic system independently of them
(see Adger, 2007, for linguistic evidence). Further linguistic
investigation is required to understand the relationship between
quantifier scope and finiteness, especially since not all languages
mark finiteness overtly, but all languages seem to restrict the
scope of quantifiers in similar ways. We think it likely that there
will be some formal specification of the point of transfer, as
empirically quantifier scope seems to always respect finite clause
boundaries when they are detectable, but exactly how this plays
out across a richer range of languages is still something of an open
question.
The final principle we appealed to in our explanation of the
workings of bound variable anaphora is the following.
(54) Pronounce Once: When a single object appears at more
than one position in a structure, pronounce only one
instance.
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This principle is at work in the interpretation of structures
where a single syntactic unit is present at two distinct places
in the generated structure. Phenomenologically, we hear a
single pronunciation of some constituent, but there is linguistic
(including psycholinguistic) evidence for its presence elsewhere
in the structure. We saw this principle at work in our analysis of
(55) [repeated from (42-a)]:
(55) Which of his relatives did the sybils decree that no man
may love?
The bound pronoun his behaves as though it is in the scope
of no man, although the phrase it is embedded within (which
of his relatives) is clearly not in a surface position that would
allow that. The solution is to take which of his relatives to be
Merged with love, where no man can scope over it, and then to
Merge again, ending up in its surface position. Independently,
we also need to explain how this phrase is interpreted as the
object of the verb love, so the proposal that it Merges with that
verb is motivated. There is good psycholinguistic evidence that
the human sentence processing mechanism is sensitive to the
presence of a single constituent in multiple positions in the parse-
tree it constructs while comprehending a sentence with such
long-distance dependencies (Lewis and Phillips, 2015, for review
and references) and that it detects unpronounced constituents in
general (Cai et al., 2015), providing evidence from processing for
this linguistic analysis.
(54) is stipulated here as a language specific principle.
It applies to realize syntactic objects as phonological objects
in a way that is dependent on the nature of the structure.
Chomsky (2013) has speculated that it might be understood as
emerging from a particular kind of reduction of computation,
perhaps minimization of the phonological computation that is
required. On the assumption that a series of phonological rules
need to apply to the output of the syntax, if there are two
instantiations of the structure, the same phonological rules will
have to apply to both instantiations, increasing the amount
of computation. If there are a great many dependencies to be
formed in a particular structure, the same phonology would
appear multiple times. If the phonological computation can
simply be done once, phonological processing is dramatically
reduced.
It seems unlikely, as Chomsky notes, that this principle is
functionally motivated to enhance parsing, as the absence of
a phonological signal marking a grammatical dependency like
a relative clause, is inimical to constructing the correct parse.
Similarly, this principle applied to quantifier scope leads to an
increase in grammatical ambiguity, again a property which would
seem difficult to motivate on functional grounds.
If this principle is not functionally motivated by
communicative or parsing pressures, might it be exapted
from elsewhere in cognition, as we suggested for aspects
of periodicity and locality? It is certainly the case that a
fundamental aspect of human cognition is the keeping track of
an identical object in time and space. Leslie et al. (1998) propose
an internal representation for objects that functions as an index
(much like pointing) and use this to explain the relationship
between perceptual and conceptual representations of objects
(cf. Pylyshyn, 1989). Speculating again, it may be the case that
a mechanism that is used for objecthood in a domain outside
of language is at play, though the structures to which it applies
are linguistic, rather than visual or conceptual. If this is the case,
then the index is phonologically realized, but points to different
instances in syntactic space of the same syntactic unit. Once
again, a cognition general property is specialized to the way that
linguistic knowledge is structured.
The suggestions we have made are speculative, but the core
point is that by developing theoretically deep explanations of
linguistic phenomena, we can begin to evaluate the domain
specificity of the abstract principles proposed in the knowledge
that these principles are solidly based in the empirical
phenomena of language.
5. Conclusion
We have outlined a general phenomenon at the syntax-semantic
interface, shown how it is cross-linguistically valid, provided both
a descriptive outline of its empirical properties and a theory of
some depth explaining why those properties are as they are. We
have also argued that no reasonable alternative (currently) exists.
All current approaches that achieve a good level of empirical
success are generative in a sense recognizable from the kind
of theory we sketch here (although they may be expressed in
different generative frameworks, such as Categorial Grammar,
Jacobson, 1999, or Lexical Functional Grammar, Dalrymple et al.,
1997).
This paper makes a methodological point and a theoretical
point. The methodological point is that principles to be
evaluated for domain specificity should be principles that
actually do explanatory work in capturing linguistic phenomena.
That is, we need to understand the nature of the linguistic
phenomena first, and use that understanding to ask more general
questions of cognitive science. Any alternative approach that
ignores or dismisses a vast range of empirically impeccable
work, and attempts to show that some proposed principle of
communication or learning explains something general about
language is insufficient. Any such alternative needs to have, or
at very least be in principle capable of extending to, the kind of
empirical coverage and explanatory depth of current generative
linguistic theory.
The more theoretical point we have made is that three
core principles, motivated from work in theoretical linguistics,
when evaluated in terms of domain-specificity suggest something
interesting. At a very abstract level, some of these principles
may well be at play outside of the human language faculty, as
principles of the optimization of space, periodicity of information
transfer, and object identity. However, when instantiated in the
human language faculty, they operate over linguistic entities
created by Merge. Merge itself, we argued on the basis of
cross-species comparison, appears to be unique to humans
and therefore the result of some evolutionary event. It is not
obvious that Merge plays a role elsewhere in human cognition
(aside, perhaps, in possibly language-related areas such as
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music and arithmetic), or in natural law more generally, but
further investigation may change our current perspective on
this.
What does this discussion have to contribute to the question
of whether there is an innate, language specific cognitive system?
It suggests that there are principles that play a role in explaining
empirical linguistic facts which may be language-specialized
versions of more general cognitive principles. The human brain,
then, appears to be set up in a way that involves the canalized
development of such specialization. That is part of, if not the
whole of, Universal Grammar.
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